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Abstract
Today, the world of critical care medicine has given us the
capabilities to accomplish things that were only dreamed of a few
decades ago. When combined with the thcreasing importance of
patient autonomy and economics in healthcare, these new capabili
ties have caused conflicts about what is too little, and what is too
much. Medical futility becomes an issue whenever these conflicts
arise. Understanding how to deal with issues surrounding futility
begins with defining it. A firm definition is not possible or desirable,
but revolves around the probability of being able to achieve a
patient’s goal with modern medicine. Establishing this understand
ing between the patient and their family (team), and the healthcare
team, is dependent on trust between the two. It must be recognized
that there are many reasons for families to not trust healthcare
professionals and that these reasons need to be explored and dealt
with. Sometimes conflicts regarding predictions and economics
need to be addressed. Once trust is established a goal for a course
of medical treatment should be discussed from the patient’s per
spective. This discussion should Thvolve the physician s beStjudge
ment as to the chances of achieving this goal, and what type of
discomfort orindignity, ifany, the patient may experience. Onlyafter
these have been clearly discussed can decisions regarding medi
cal futility be made. To date, the U.S. Courts have refused to grant
physicians and hospitals the power to override the opinions of family
members on matters of futility. However, with time, a consensus of
public opinion should influence decisions regardmg medical futility.
Introduction
The role of the physician has always been to help the sick and
injured. Foremost to this has been the desire to cure or mend the
patient in order to return them to functional health. Today, an equally
important part of caring for patients is helping them die with dignity
and without suffering when they cannot be cured or mended.
Nowhere is this dual role more important than in the modern
Intensive Care Unit (ICU). Here the physician has at his disposal
knowledge, machines, and monitors which can in many cases
sustain physiologic life almost indefinitely. For the critical care
physician the determination of when care is ‘worthwhile’ and when
it becomes ‘medically futile’ becomes a constant struggle that takes
place not only within the context of the individual’s own values and
ethics, but also with those of the patient and their family. This
Correspondence to:
Lewis L Low, M.D., F.A.C.P.
Director, Critical Care Medicine
St. Francis Medical Center
2230 Liliha Street
Honolulu, HI 96817
struggle is illustrated by the estimate that 90% ofpatients (compared
with 51% in 1988) who die in ICUs do so after a decision has been
made to withdraw or withhold life support, making it the most
common cause of death in the ICU.’
More recently, society has had to face the reality that medical
resources are not unlimited and that some mechanism for distribut
ing these resources must be found. This has added to the equation the
issue of economics and led to the new bad word for the next century,
“managed care.” Thus, medical futility is a term that has incited a
whole host of discussions bringing together conflicts regarding
autonomy, paternalism, trust, primacy oflife, quality of life, healthcare
reform, and medical rationing. It is a concept that, when taken
literally, applies to very few cases, but when interpreted broadly and
within the context of the imprecision of medicine, is frequently
invoked. We will not solve the debate over medical futility, rather
we will discuss its issues so as to help the participant understand the
concepts and be prepared to help themselves, other healthcare
professionals, and, most importantly, patients and families, deal
with it when it arises.
Attempting to Define Medical Futility
Historically, physicians made decisions based upon the basic
principles of beneficence (do good) and nonmalefience (do not
inflict intentional harm).2These issues were usually discussed and
decided among the physicians and information was disclosed selec
tively in order to maintain control over what they felt was best for the
patient. This allowed them to withhold care that was felt to be of no
benefit. In the words of Hippocrates, to not provide interventions to
those “overmastered by their diseases.”3Perhaps as a backlash to
this paternalism, ethics and the law today give primacy to the
principle of autonomy. Patients can refuse any intervention, even
life saving ones. However, today’s practitioners often interpret this
as meaning that they must also offer every available treatment, no
matter how absurd or overzealous, and that they must allow patients
and families to decide when treatment is futile. Health care reform
and the debates of today have begun to elevate the importance of
distributive justice in medical ethics.2 This is the idea that all of
society should have an equal distribution of medical resources. The
Single Master View illustrates the concern that this concept brings
about, stating that health care providers “should not be providers and
rationers of health care simultaneously.”4
Throughout history the concept of futility has been imprecise. If
discussed among a group of individuals, terms such as not going to
work, impossible, very unlikely, wasted effort, and useless are
typical of what might be used. The word futility is derived from the
Latinfutitis, which means one that pours or melts. Greek mythology
holds that the daughters ofKing Argos, having killed their husbands,
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were condemned by the God Hades, to collect water for eternity
using leaky sieves.5 Oxford Dictionary interprets this as an action
that is “leaky, hence untrustworthy, vain, failing of the desired end
through intrinsic defect.”’ Random House Dictionary calls it “inca
pable of producing any result; ineffective, useless, not successful.”7
In a medical sense, a futile action is one that is unable to achieve the
desired goal or result.8
Hippocrates called on clinicians to acknowledge when their
efforts would probably fail, stating, “whenever.. .a man suffers from
an ill which is too strong for the means at the disposal of medicine,
he surely must not even expect that it can be overcome by
medicine... .to attempt such futile treatment is to display an igno
rance which is allied to madness.” Hippocratic teaching further
indicates that it is improper for a physician to engage in a practice
that is hopeless, or that causes more burden than benefit.3
At the patient’s bedside medical futility becomes an issue when
families (or physicians) demand care that to others seems to be
unreasonable. This care can leave care givers feeling frustrated,
cause pain and suffering for patients and families, and waste
precious resources. Sometimes this can be the result of denial, a lack
of understanding or trust, or personal beliefs.
A Goal Oriented approach to determining medical futility has
been advocated by Younger.9He believes that determining that an
action is futile must be based upon identification of a “goal.” Next,
it must be determined if the goal is attainable. Finally, it must be
considered whether the goal is worth achieving and at what cost.
Examples of possible goals in medicine are:’°
1. Physiologic - Will a mechanical ventilator adequately oxygen
ate a patient?
2. Postponing Death - Will a mechanical ventilator postpone
death?
3. Improving the Quality or the Duration of Life - Will mechani
cally ventilating the patient allow him or her to eventually live
independently?
The Society ofCritical Care Medicine has taken a similarposition,
although narrower. In May 1997, it defined futility as actions that
“will not accomplish their intended goal.” They cited four categories
of treatment; treatments with no physiologic benefit, those ex
tremely unlikely to be of benefit, those that have some beneficial
effect, but are extremely costly, and those of uncertain or controver
sial benefit. Only the first category would be futile, and thus futility
should be invoked only rarely, and should usually not be disputed.8
The U.S. Department of Veteran’s Affairs has stated that “futile
treatment may be defined as that which affords no benefit, or
marginal benefit, weighing intrusiveness, burden, and risk against
the ultimate outcome.” This approach is broader and considers both
the risk and burden with outcome. Rather than defining futility the
VA sought to give examples of futility, such as treatment that would
only prolong suffering or the dying process, patients that have no
hope of leaving the Intensive Care Unit, treatments that have
supportive data of poor outcome or provides only physiologic
benefit without hope of attaining the patient’s goals.”
In Hawaii, the St. Francis Healthcare System has stated that
futility needs to be addressed on a case-by-case basis, but should be
considered whenever “treatment options have little or no chance of
providing benefit.” They give examples of this including treatments
that only prolong the dying process or patient suffering, maintain a
persistent vegetative state, will not end permanent dependence on
intensive care, do not improve the quality of life, or where there is
no data to indicate a likelihood of a successful outcome.’
An alternative approach to determining medical futility is Prob
ability Oriented. According to this approach a treatment should be
considered medically futile if one of two categories are met. The
“quantitative” category of futility occurs when an intervention has
been useless in the last 100 cases. Statistically, this would give the
clinician 95% confidence that no more than 3 successes would occur
in each 100 trials. The “qualitative” category of futility is when any
treatment merely preserves a permanent state of unconsciousness or
fails to end a total dependence on intensive medical care. This
treatment should be regarded as nonbeneficial and, therefore, fu
tile.” Such treatment should not be offered and, if demanded, should
not be given)3This approach has been criticized, in part, because of
the unlikelihood that any one practitioner will have attempted a
treatment on 100 occasions.’4’5
A more recent concept in futility has been the Futility Gap. This
gap is defined as the distance between the highest level of function
ing achievable by medical care and the lowest quality of life
acceptable to the patient.’6
Although most experts seem to base definitions of futility upon a
goal oriented approach, a practical working definition probably lies
somewhere between this and the others. Caplan summed it up by
stating that, “medical futility must be understood as referring to both
the probability and the desirability of attaining a...goal.”7Futility
can be thought of as the final standard for terminating care when the
patient’s own wishes cannot be determined.
Where is the Trust?
Today, the most common mode of death in the ICU is the
withdrawal or withholding of life support.’8This decision is usually
based upon the physician’s assessment of a poor prognosis. Ninety
percent of families agree, within five days, to a physician’s recom
mendation to limit life support, and only 4% refuse such recommen
dations altogether.’ Thus the majority of patients and families are
willing to place significant trust in their physicians when it comes to
matters of life or death.
Recently, however, in forums ranging from the U.S. Congress to
Hollywood and the Academy Awards, restricted access to proper
healthcare has begun to make patients wary of healthcare organiza
tions and physicians, and has begun to erode the traditional trust that
the public has placed in its doctors. This places even greater
responsibility on the physician when patients or families disagree or
are hesitant to follow their recommendations concerning futile care.
Personal values of physicians can easily cloud decisions of medical
futility.’9Studies have found that clinicians themselves differ about
what constitutes quality of1fe. Wachter found that despite the same
statistical prognosis, physicians were more willing to write DNR
orders for patients with a diagnosis of AIDS or cancer, than liver or
heart disease.2°An article by Curtis indicates that non-whites had
more DNR orders than whites, despite the same diagnosis and
prognosis.2’Thus the danger of having physicians give guidance in
these matters is that the guidance may be more opinion than medical
judgement and are thus subject to abuse. Trust can play a significant
role in a patient’s or family’s response to a physician’s decisions.
Trust can also be put into question by the principle of Effect
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Versus Benefit)3 In a patient has suffered a massive stroke that has
left her in a vegetative state, intubation and mechanical ventilation
will have the effect of maintaining oxygenation to the patient’s
organs, but it will not produce the benefit of restoring the patient to
conscious life. Is this treatment futile? Most people would feel that
this is futile, but some people might believe in the ultimate impor
tance of biological life and disagree)3Can there be trust when the
values of patients differ fundamentally from those of the care
givers? Veatch has stated, “life-prolonging care is
fundamental.. ..How offensive it must be to a patient who believes in
the ultimate value of biological life to be prohibited access to life-
prolonging care by one’s clinician.”22When trust is lost the difficul
ties grow. Families often begin to pit one member of the healthcare
team against another. They seek out inconsistencies in statements
feeling that pointing these out to the providers will force them to give
better care.’6
The best way to avoid these situations is to establish trust and
understanding through communication. Communication must be
established early and be honest and open. Preferably this is done in
the office or pre-morbid setting where the stress is minimal and the
patient’s interests can be protected beforehand.23
Can Medical Futility Be Predicted?
The use of withdrawing and withholding of life support prior to a
patient’s death has grown dramatically throughout the 1990s. In
general, this determination is being done by physicians based upon
their knowledge of diseases, the particular patient, and their own
experience orjudgement. However, the reliability of these physician
determinations has come increasingly into question. Today, there
are multiple severity of illness models that provide an estimate of a
patient’s hospital mortality. Some of the more widely tested models
include the Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation
(APACHE),24 Mortality Prediction Model (MPM),25 Simplified
Acute Physiology Score (SAPS),26and the Pediatric Risk of Mortal
ity (PRISM).27 Recently, the Potentially Ineffective Care (PlC)
model has attempted to predict combined outcomes of high resource
utilization and short survival.28Many of these, in particularAPACHE
and SUPPORT, have established very large databases from which
they have cross-validated and tested models to predict survival
chances. These models have become indispensable as a point of
reference for comparing outcomes between divergent ICUs and for
stratifying populations based upon severity of illness for critical care
research.
Can these models be used to predict individual outcomes and thus,
medical futility? The current answer to this question is no. First, the
concepts ofprobability and confidence intervals are very difficult to
understand for most practitioners, let alone patients and their fami
lies. The predictions are often reported in a wide range of times and
percentages. For example, during a retrospective review, the SUP
PORT database predicted that an individual had a 17% chance of
surviving for 2 months on the day before the patient actually died.
It likewise gave the patient a 51% chance of2 month survival 1 week
before actual death.29 Review of data from APACHE showed
similar, although slightly more pessimistic, results.29In addition, the
severity of illness models, by their nature, do not factor in data about
patient preferences and goals, and individual experiences. Despite
these constraints, attempts to develop databases of sufficient power
to be able to predict futility continue. Teres has stated that “with the
increasing size of various databases there may soon be enough
patients to reach quantative estimates, as suggested by Schiderman,
et. a!.”3°
Today, severity of illness models, while potentially helpful in
guiding a physician, cannot be used as a sole guide for determining
medical futility.
The Role of Managed Care in Medical Futility
Controlling the spiraling costs of healthcare has become a major
priority in the United States. The recognition of limited resources
and the promise of unlimited medical capabilities has led to the
development of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO) in an
attempt to control costs, while continuing to provide state-of-the-art
care. This has especially reached into the ICU, where cost and
technology clash daily with medical futility. It has been estimated
that up to 28% of all acute hospital costs come from the ICU, so it
would seem to be the logical place to practice cost containment.3’
More recently, a backlash against HMOs has derived from the
perception that they are cutting costs and making money at the
expense of patients and their healthcare. Highly influential public
mediums such as the movies, newspapers, television, and even the
U.S. Congress and the President, have sent a message that when it
comes to health, an HMO cannot be trusted. As a part of HMOs
physicians are often seen as their allies. The medical literature may
contribute to this impression by suggesting that HMO practices are
able to reduce the utilization of medical resources, such as critical
care, by restricting PlC at the end of life.32 One study found that
$10,000 per patient and 0.5% of all ICU admissions could be saved
by earlier use of DNR orders.33 Another stated that there are three
circumstances where requested interventions can be refused: when
the care is unlikely to be of benefit, when the intervention is likely
to cause more harm than good, and when the intervention conflicts
with the principle of distributive justice.34
Others have addressed the issue from a different perspective
stating, “we could not afford a universal health system based on
patient’s demands. Such systems...allocate health care to socially
powerful people.. .to the disadvantage of those with less power..
It has been suggested that the issue of allocating resources to
critically ill patients should revolve around distributive justice.2
This concept has been further refined, by some, as referring only to
those individuals that have certain moral or social value. How this
will eventually be defined and how this principle will eventually be
applied to critical care remains to be seen. Traditionally, during busy
times when resources are scarce, the average severity of illness or
acuity increases in ICUs.36 Today, politics and economics can play
a role in deciding who should be in an ICU.37 This has led to
widespread concern that the poor or minorities will receive dispro
portionately low levels of care.38 Until firm guidelines are estab
lished, critical care physicians need to be alert to the restriction of
resources based on questionable concepts.
To accomplish all of the above fairly, HMOs need to dedicate
appropriate resources for care, guidelines for distributing the re
sources (preferably based upon established practice guidelines),
appeal mechanisms, and monitoring systems. All of this should be
done in conjunction with physicians, administrators, and patients, in
an open atmosphere. Individual cases should be complimented by
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patient preferences and directives.39 Finally, although profit is
important, maximizing medical benefit should remain the priority.
Without such an approach the system will risk deteriorating into
something worse than when it started.
Establishing a Goal
Establishing a practical and working definition of medical futility
is a highly difficult and emotionally charged issue. Inmost cases, the
concept of futility is unnecessary because the patient’s family and
physicians quickly come to agreement about how to care for the
patient. When there are conflicts, however, they are strongly felt by
both the healthcare team and the family. Because of the often
differing perspectives of the parties involved, what may be futile to
one group may be beneficial to another. Values can become pre
sented as futility. Thus a firm broadly applicable definition is
probably not possible or advisable. As we have seen, some authors
and organizations have felt that most issues revolving around futility
can be resolved by the establishment of a goal. Focusing on the goal
and then the possible interventions is probably the best approach.
For various reasons, most clinicians interact with families using an
intervention-oriented approach. However, the best way to establish
a goal is a goal-oriented approach.
Two scenarios will help to illustrate the difference between an
intervention-oriented and a goal-oriented approach. A 76 year old
man has severe pneumonia on top of his end-stage lung disease.
Prior to this he was limited in his activities, but interactive and
enjoyed visiting with his family. His mental and respiratory status is
deteriorating to the point that he may require mechanical ventilation.
Intervention-Oriented
- The physician approaches the family and
states, “your father is getting very sick. Do you want us to continue
to do everything?” or “Do you want us to put him on a breathing
machine?” This approach is very common and can be very stressful
and misleading to a family. Most (not all) people want a cure for their
loved one, something that will at least return them to a level equal
or better than before their hospitalization.9When offered an inter
vention without discussing the chances of achieving this goal, many
families will infer that the goal must be achievable or else it wouldn’t
be discussed.9Unrealistic goals can quickly develop. In addition,
when offered without discussion, many families perceive a burden
of deciding whether or not they should allow the death of their loved
one without the knowledge of the chances of actually achieving a
cure. This is not fair. Another intervention-oriented approach is to
unilaterally not offer or refuse interventions that the family may
desire, without helping them understand the unpleasant realities or
the ability of the intervention to achieve the goal.9
Goal-Oriented - The physician sits down with the family and
explains why their father has begun to deteriorate. He focuses the
discussion on the present situation. A discussion ensues about what
outcome (goal) they believe their father would desire if he were able
to participate. It may be revealed that he had a living will or that he
had voiced an opinion to a family member. Possible goals may be:
a fully independent life, life where he can interact with his family,
life at home, or, in some cases, biological existence at all costs.
Patients and families are more inclined to request futile interven
tions when they do not have adequate information about diagnosis
and prognosis.9The levels of medical uncertainty or mistrust of the
physician may become evident and can be dealt with. Once a goal is
established a decision on an intervention must still be based on the
probability of success weighed against the quality of the outcome.
Low probability can be balance by high value or utility. Different
interventions impose different amounts of pain, suffering and indig
nity on the patient and family. A patient may want a certain goal, but
only be willing to put up with a certain amount to achieve it. Thus
a conclusion to a goal may be transfer to the intensive care unit,
intubation and mechanical ventilation for a period of time, to see if
the patient recovers. Or it can be to forego intubation altogether and
to allow the patient to die peacefully. Or it can be full care at all costs,
with eventual transfer to a full care facility. It is important to realize
that differences in these matters may not be about futility, but rather
about values or goals.
The Courts and Futility
The cases of Karen Ann Quinlan (1976) and Claire Conroy
(1985), both in New Jersey, and Barber (1983), in California,
established the rights of families and patients to refuse or withdraw
care, even if that care was life sustaining or saving.40 Of interest is
the decisions by the courts pertaining to the right of physicians to
refuse interventions demanded by a patient or family.
United States Courts have so far refused to grant physicians and
hospitals the power to override the opinions and desires of family
members when they desire continuing life support, especially if the
patient is not overtly suffering. They have yet to address the specific
issue of medical futility. Baby L (1990) was a 2 year old girl with
severe neurologic disabilities who required repeated hospitaliza
tions for uncontrolled seizures and recurrent aspiration pneumonias.
The physicians sought to withhold further aggressive interventions,
but the mother insisted. Before the issue could be decided by the
courts another facility was found that was willing to care for the
patient.4’Helga Wanglie (1991) was a 85 year old woman who was
ventilator dependent in a persistent vegetative-state. After they were
unable to obtain the agreement of the family to withdraw support, the
hospital asked the courts to appoint a conservator on the grounds that
such care was futile because it was not beneficial (not physiologi
cally futile). The husband cross-filed, requesting that he be the
appointed conservator. The court then appointed the husband as the
conservator. However, before the issue of whether or not health
professionals could override a family’s wishes was further dis
cussed, Mrs. Wanglie died. Observers have noted that the court
agreed with the husband by appointing him as the conservator, citing
this as evidence that the court supported the principle that who was
making a decision was more important than what the decision was.42
The key here was not so much futility, but goals. Baby K (1992) was
born anencephalic and required repeated hospitalizations for me
chanical ventilation. No other hospital would take the child, so the
Virginia hospital turned to the courts and requested that they not be
required to provide mechanical ventilation to the child, citing a
Virginia statute that states physicians are not required to “prescribe
or render medical treatment” that is “medically or ethically inappro
priate.” Eventually the courts sided with the mother, citing a federal
law requiring hospitals and practioners to pt’wide emergency care
when requested. Notably, they avoided the issue of whether or not
patients with futile conditions should be provided with supportive
care.9
Societal consensus or opinion plays an important role in how
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courts interpret the “public interest.” While it is recognized that most
people look at a permanent state of unconsciousness as an undigni
fied existence, the courts have refused to state that this opinion is
absolute. This legal posture may begin to change over time. Public
opinion poiis have consistently revealed that the majority of Ameri
cans do not believe that patients in a persistent vegetative state
should receive unlimited life sustaining interventions. Although it is
of physiologic benefit, such interventions are not capable of return
ing the patient to interactive life. On the basis of persistent public
opinion on the issue, standards for withdrawing futile care in these
circumstances can be developed that will be supported by the courts.
Already it has been suggested that patients in a vegetative state
should be assumed to not want life prolonging support unless
evidence exists to the contrary.43 Economic constraints may also
influencejudicial decisions. In 1995, a Massachusetts jury acquitted
the physicians of Catherine Gilgunn (a 72 year old woman who had
suffered irreversible brain damage) of malpractice for entering a Do
Not Resuscitate order on her, shortly after which she subsequently
died. One of the patient’s daughters had adamantly opposed this
step, despite agreement with the physicians by the patient’s other
two daughters. The patient’s husband had refused to intervene. The
court stated that “the State’s interest in pursuing life is high when
human life can be saved..., but wanes when the afflictions are
incurable.” It further stated that we must “balance her (the patient’s)
preference against the medical judgement to withdraw such treat
ment in the context of not whether, but for how long and at what cost,
her life might be extended.”16Thus a consensus regarding healthcare
goals for society may influence the definition of futility.
Discussion
Today, the world of critical care medicine has given us the
capabilities to accomplish things that were only dreamed of a few
decades ago. When combined with the increasing importance of
patient autonomy and economics in healthcare, these new capabili
ties have caused conflicts about what is too little, and what is too
much. Medical futility becomes an issue whenever these conflicts
arise. Understanding how to deal with issues surrounding futility
begins with defining it. A firm definition is not possible or desirable,
but revolves around the probability of being able to achieve a
patient’s goal with modern medicine. Establishing this understand
ing between the patient and their family (team), and the healthcare
team, is dependent on trust between the two. It must be recognized
that there are many reasons for families to not trust healthcare
professionals and that these reasons need to be explored and dealt
with. Sometimes conflicts regarding predictions and economics
need to be addressed. Once trust is established a goal for a course of
medical treatment should be discussed from the patient’s perspec
tive. This discussion should involve the physician’s best judgement
as to the chances of achieving this goal, and what type of discomfort
or indignity, if any, the patient may experience. Only after these have
been clearly discussed can decisions regarding medical futility be
made. To date, the U.S. Courts have refused to grant physicians and
hospitals the power to override the opinions of family members on
matters of futility. However, with time, a consensus of public
opinion should influence decisions regarding medical futility.
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